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1.0 Introduction 
 
When studying “arguments” or teaching courses about them  -- in contrast to providing an 
argument -- we are operating at the meta-level.  The meta-level/object-level distinction is 
familiar from formal logic where it is frequently stressed when initially laying out the object 
language or proving that a theory constructed in the object language has various properties, e.g., 
consistency or completeness. However, instructions about how to carry out the tasks of informal 
logic are also at the meta-level.   What is the nature of these instructions? 
Textbooks (whether in formal or informal logic) contain similarities.  All introduce 
concepts and contain specifications of the criteria to be met if a concept is applicable, specify 
procedures to be followed to obtain the desired results, rules to be followed, check lists, 
guidelines, rules of thumb, etc. (with the caution that there will be exceptions), and various kinds 
of instances including examples, illustrations, and problems on which the student is invited to 
test their understanding.    
What I want to do in this paper is survey a number of sets of instructions utilized in 
informal logic, especially those concerned with argument recognition and reconstruction. After 
accomplishing this survey, the issues that an account of these instructions face will be rehearsed, 
and then the paper will turn to a look at several analyses that have been provided, consider some 
possible alternative analyses, and finally briefly point out some of the considerations that follow 
from the discussion. Informal logic is a multi-faceted enterprise with tasks other than those 
mentioned above so numerous aspects will not be considered, but this subset of the tasks is rich 
enough to provide numerous issues for consideration. 
 
 
2.0 Instances of Instructions – Round I 
 
My first example of instructions is the set of general strategies for standardizing 
arguments provided by Trudy Govier (Govier 2001, pp 38-39). 
 
1. Read the passage carefully several times, making sure you understand it. 
2. Confirm that the passage you are dealing with actually contains an argument.  It contains an 
argument if, and only if, the author is trying to support a position with claims offered in its 
defense. 
3. Identify the main conclusion or conclusions and any sub-argument structures. Indicator words 
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should help. Often the context is helpful, particularly when one person argues against another. 
Typically in that case, one person’s conclusion will be the denial of the other person’s position; 
and the person denying another’s position will offer reasons for doing so. 
4. Identify those statements in the passage that are put forward as support for the main conclusion 
and any sub-conclusions. It is helpful at this stage to look at the statements in the passage and ask 
yourself which ones could plausibly give support, or be thought of as giving support, to the 
conclusion you have identified. 
5.  Omit any material that serves purely as background information, for example, introductory or 
editorial remarks, 
6.  Omit material that you have already included.  This instruction applies when the same premise 
or conclusion is stated several times in slightly different words, except in two circumstances.  
First, if this happens when the different wording indicates first a premise and then a conclusion 
in the same argument do put the statement twice in your standardized version. (As we will see 
later, this situation means there is a serious flaw in the argument.)  Second, you may wish to do 
this if a statement is first the conclusion in a sub-argument, and then serves as a premise in the 
main argument.  In other circumstances, don’t repeat the statement. 
7.  Omit such personal phrases as “I have long thought,” “in my humble opinion,” and so on.  
These are not part of the content of the argument but are stylistic indicators of the author’s 
direction. 
8.  Number each premise and conclusion, and write the argument in the standard form with the 
premises above the conclusion. 
9.  Check that each premise and conclusion is a self-contained complete statement.  This means 
that premises and conclusions should not include pronouns such as he, my, it, and this.  Instead, 
the appropriate nouns should be used.  Also, premises and conclusions should be in the form of 
statements, not questions, commands, or exclamations. 
10.  Check that no premise or conclusion itself expresses a whole argument.  For instance, if one 
premise says, “John has lied before so he is unreliable,” you need to break this premise further 
into (1) John has lied before and (2) John is unreliable.  In the structure (1) will be shown as 
supporting (2) in a sub-argument.  The sub-argument will not be shown if you write “John has 
lied before so he is unreliable” as a single premise. 
11.  Check your standardized version against the original to see whether you have left out 
anything essential, or included anything that, on reflection, you think should not be included. 
 
 
3.0 A Brief Analytical Segue 
 
Note that  these individual statements have imperative characteristics starting with action 
verbs such as “identify”, “check”, “omit”. The injunctions to take action generally do not include 
criteria to know when the action has been satisfactorily carried out. (This is not making the claim 
that criteria are not provided elsewhere.)  Govier’s label for this set of statements is general 
strategies.  Despite this name, collectively they appear to be more of a “block” flow chart of the 
major tasks in identifying and reconstructing an argument found in ordinary discourse. 
Each of these strategies, in turn, requires a whole other set of instructions about how to 
carry out the particular task named. This in turn will involve yet additional tasks. A complete 
analysis would require a detailed examination of the sub-tasks required by each of these 
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injunctions. Because of the constraints of this paper we will examine only one.  The third 
“strategy” listed above involves identifying the components of an argument.    Instructions for 
carrying out the sub-tasks involved in this include providing lists of words  to help determine that 
a passage contains an argument and which statements are playing which role.  It is to an 
examination of these additional instructions I now turn.  
 
 
4.0 Instances of Instructions – Round II 
 
The following two lists of "inference structural words or phrases" are useful in sorting out 
premises and conclusion in ordinary discourse (Thomas 1986, pp.12-13). 
  Partial list of words or phrases that often function as inference indicators PRECEDING 
PREMISES  
  
as...(many exceptions) 
 
 
 
seeing that...  
 
since...(many exceptions) 
 
 
 
for the reasons that...  
 
for...(many exceptions) 
 
 
 
in view of the fact that...  
 
because... 
 
 
 
on the correct supposition  
 
as shown by... 
 
 
 
that...  
 
as indicated by... 
 
 
 
assuming, as we may, that... 
 
follows from... 
 
 
 
may be inferred from...  
 
being that... 
 
 
 
may be deduced from... 
 
being as...  
 
 
 
may be derived from... 
 
inasmuch as... 
 
 
 
whereas...(in legal documents)  
 
in the first place... 
 
 
 
in the second place...  
 
firstly... 
 
 
 
secondly... 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Partial list of words or phrases that often function as inference indicators PRECEDING 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
consequently…   points to the conclusion … 
 
therefore…    that… 
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which shows that…   allows us to infer that…. 
 
proves that…    suggests very strongly that… 
 
hence…    leads me to believe that… 
 
so…     bears out the point that… 
 
you see that…    thus…(frequent expectations) 
 
implies that…    demonstrates that… 
 
entails that…    it follows that… 
 
accordingly…    in this way one sees that… 
 
I conclude that…   then…(without preceding ‘if’; has expectations) 
 
 Standard warnings about the complications that may be faced when using indicator 
words include: (i) not all arguments contain indicator words; (ii) some indicator words have 
functions other than as indicator words; (iii) sometimes indicator words indicate forms of 
reasoning other arguments, e.g., explanations; (iv) conclusions are sometimes missing from 
arguments; (v) some discourses are borderline with respect to whether they contain an argument; 
and (vi) no listing of indicator words will be complete. 
As an instance of an argument without indicator words consider: “It is going to snow.  
You should make sure that the snowblower has gasoline.” 
  Some indicator words such as “for” and “since”, are ambiguous, having grammatical 
roles in addition to their role as reasoning indicators. Consider these statements: 
 
He did the job for ten dollars an hour. 
The earth is at least 4 billion years old, for some of its rocks have been shown to be this 
old. 
She has been gone since the Fourth of July. 
Since today is her birthday, we can expect cake and ice cream. 
 
The italicized terms in the second and fourth statements are reasoning indicators, but in 
the first and third statements, they play a different role.  A reasoning indicator is usually followed 
by a sentence or a clause.  In contrast, when these sentences are playing a different grammatical 
role, they are often followed by a phrase that is not a sentence or a clause as in the first and third 
statements (Lee 2002, pg. 41). 
The presence of an expression from the reasoning indicator list is not an infallible 
indication of an argument.  These expressions are often reasoning indicators rather than specific 
indicators of an argument. Two such alternative forms of reasoning are explanations and 
predictions.  Since all are forms of reasoning, something other than a reasoning indicator must be 
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utilized to distinguish among them. Temporal sequence and purpose are often suggested as 
means to distinguish between an explanation and an argument.  If the conclusion of the reasoning 
is an accepted fact, then the reasoning is an explanation. However, if the  premises are put 
forward as grounds to justify a conclusion as true, then we are dealing with an argument.  
Arguments offer justifications; explanations offer understanding.   
Some texts use other indicators besides direct inference indicator words listed previously. 
General indicators can be whether the passage deals with investigation and controversy.  Word 
indicators of this include: “evidence”, “clue”, “discover”, and “investigators.”  Many general 
indicators are contained in proposals and recommendations around which controversy swirls.  
These often contain normative terms such as “should”, “ought”, “right”, and “wrong.”  
Indirectness flags --major ones are “must”, “may”, “probably”, “likely”, “apparently”, and 
“seems”-- indicate not known directly, but inferred from something else and thus indicate 
arguments.  Pairs of these indicators are particularly powerful -- indirectness coupled with 
support or implication;  indirectness in an investigation; and a proposal or recommendation with 
support or implication (Wright 2001, pp.108-114). 
 
 
5.0 For what does a conception of  instructions have to account? 
 
5.1 The Phenomena 
 
 What are the phenomena that the instructions are attempting to deal with? What we have 
seen demonstrates that the instructions provided have to deal with situations of considerable 
complexity.  However, we have looked at a limited number of instances.  Other complexities are 
known and have been discussed elsewhere. It is worth summarizing this additional complexity to 
be faced by pointing out the considerations posed for argument identification by  -- context, 
purpose, theory, underdetermination by evidence, the difference in interpretation made by 
whether one holds a compositional and a wholistic conception of argument, the nature of the 
concepts being utilized, and the nature of the reasoning involved, etc (Asquith 2001a, 2002). 
 There are a variety of ways in which there can be context dependency -- knowledge and 
intents brought to the situation by the individuals; the situation itself taken holistically; the 
broader environment in which the situation is located. Background knowledge, judgment, and 
discretion are relevant to argument interpretation as are social and dialectical contexts.  Even 
one’s assessment of the truth of the premises depends on what one knows. 
 Theory makes a difference.  What will be identified as an argument differs according to 
the view of argument held.  If an intended entailment is identified as an argument, then there are 
clearly valid deductive entailments which will be identified as arguments, e.g., addition, 
conjunction, or repetition. However, most individuals not schooled in formal logic are generally 
reluctant to consider these as arguments and they would be rejected by numerous non-entailment 
theories of argument. It is also the case that evaluation criteria adequate for ensuring that we have 
a “good” argument also depend on the theory adopted.   
 There can be underdetermination by evidence, immediate context, and theory.  While 
theory and context play critical roles in determining whether we have an argument and if the 
argument is “good”, the claim being made is not that knowing both theory and context will 
always make clear how to interpret and evaluate a passage. Knowing all of these things can still 
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leave one in a position where more than one argumentative interpretation of the passage is 
possible. 
Arguments are constituted of various components, e.g., claims, structures, etc.  What are 
the relationships between these various components?  There are several approaches a theory of 
argument might take -- a compositional/component approach or a more contextual/holistic 
approach.  On the compositional approach each component is regarded as capable of relatively 
independent treatment while on the other components need to be treated in relationship to one 
another as well as the overall context in which they occur.  On the first view, reading with 
comprehension is the understanding of the basic substantive claims being made in the passage, 
which occurs independently of argument structure and evaluation.  Understanding some of the 
claims may be context dependent, but is not seriously theory dependent.  The second 
interpretation makes understanding the argumentative structure as well as the evaluation of 
argument candidates an inherent component of basic comprehension of the passage.  Which way 
should an ambiguous claim be interpreted?  On the wholistic approach the argument structure as 
well as contextual clues is relevant. 
The data provided by the passage itself can contribute to the complexity of the situation. 
All of the cases considered above presuppose that the passage provides consistent information, 
but there is the possibility of conflicting data in the passage. 
 The nature of the criteria being used is also a factor.  The classical conception is that a 
criterion specifies a set of features that are singly necessary and jointly sufficient.  Although an 
instance must have all of the defining features, it is not precluded from having additional 
features. However, the defining ones are the only ones relevant to whether the criterion is met.   
If all of the defining features are present, classification succeeds; otherwise it fails.  
There are numerous discussions in the philosophical literature about the difficulty of 
providing such a specification for all concepts. Alternative types of criteria which might be 
encountered include: sufficient conditions only; statistical rules; a list of necessary conditions 
which allows elimination in the absence of one them, but provides no sufficient conditions; 
guidelines or indicators with no specification of the circumstances under which they work 
although often relatively common exceptions are pointed out. Concepts for which instances may 
be characterized in a variety of ways and for which it is not possible to come up with a definition 
in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions are sometimes referred to as “polymorphic.” 
The most basic concept in argument identification is that of “argument.” There appears to 
be no general agreement on the exact definition.  But, at least among those dealing with rational 
argument theory, all include giving reasons in support of a claim as a necessary condition.  It is at 
the next level, determining whether this or that should count as giving a reason, where the 
situation becomes complex and the appropriate criteria to utilize less clear. My belief is that all 
theories of argumentation experience similar lack of clarity when the attempt is made to apply 
the theory to ordinary discourse. 
 
 
5.2 The Reasoning 
 
In making a determination if the criteria are met one considers reasons for and against.  
Initial assessments of how strong the reason is will be subject to change.  For example, a  “since” 
may initially be taken as a premise indicator. However, once the context makes clear that it is 
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being utilized as a temporal adverb, the initial belief that the “since” indicates a reason both to 
suppose that there is an inference and that what follows is a candidate for being a premise or the 
premises is rejected. Assessing whether the criteria are met is both a process and a judgment. 
Consequently, the assessment can change over time. There are a variety of ways in which initially 
given reasons either can be eliminated, strengthened, or weakened. Among the situations under 
which an assessment might change are: (i) realizing that some of the evidence has been 
overlooked; (ii) altering the emphasis placed on a particular part of the evidence; and (iii) 
reevaluating the relevancy of portions of the passage to determining whether the criteria are 
satisfied. 
 Any interpretation of the instructions for dealing with argument recognition and 
identification is going to have to be compatible with these aspects of the situation.  The reasoning 
to determine whether or not there is an argument is in many cases, but not all, not going to be 
definitive.  Reasoning often appears to be preponderance of the evidence type reasoning. 
Consequently, both the possibility of there being evidence not previously taken into account and 
the possibility of being wrong must be allowed for.  In other words, the reasoning is non-
monotonic and defeasible. We want reliable conclusions, but do not anticipate having irrevocable 
ones.  
 
 
6.0 Instructions as Rules 
 
One of the ways of conceiving of instructions in the meta-language is to imagine that 
rules – either tacit or explicit – are being provided.  For example, in the case of indicator words 
the rule is tacit and what is really being provided is an “if, then” statement in which the 
antecedent is a statement of the form “upon finding an instance of this indicator word” and the 
consequent statement is the form “treat this as an argument or treat the statement following as the 
premise of an argument.” The literature contains several discussions of rules for argument 
recognition and specification.  A very strict interpretation of  rules would be as algorithms. 
The question as to whether it would be possible to write a general argument recognition 
and specification computer program has been asked: 
 
Questions such as these do have answers, but not always uniquely correct ones.  Ordinary 
language is far too complex for us to be able to write a general argument-recognition 
program.  There is no algorithm, or set of precise instructions, by which a person or 
machine, presented with an arbitrary body of actual discourse, can mechanically pick out 
in a finite number of steps just those sequences of sentences that are associated with the 
appropriate claims and thus constitute arguments (Blumberg 1976, 21).  
 
Note that there is a switch in this passage between a general argument recognition program and 
an algorithm that picks out the correct answer. That switch is something we will want to return to 
when considering alternative analyses.  
There are more liberal construals of “rules” than as algorithms.  In the “Poverty of 
Formalism” Govier has also dealt with this issue of whether there are rules for argument 
interpretation.  She considers four sorts of rules; (i) strict formal rules -- syntactic and hold 
universally; (ii) strict material rules -- non-syntactic but hold universally; (iii) general rules that 
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hold most of the time, but have a ceteris paribus clause; and (iv) rules of thumb -- rough 
guideline for action  (Govier 1999, pg. 90).  
Govier argues, and the previous review of the sorts of instructions provided also shows, 
that any such rules could not hold with strict universality.  For Govier this eliminates the first two 
types of rules.  She also rejects the fourth possibility listed above. Rules of thumb despite being 
called “rules” are, at best, indicators.  They lack the systematicity to be true rules.  Rejecting 
them as rules does not mean they are not useful as their frequent inclusion in informal logic texts 
attests.  The plausible candidate is a rule with a ceteris paribus clause.  But then how do we deal 
with the application of ceteris paribus clauses?  The application of such clauses appears to 
require either an exhaustive listing of the conditions under which the ceteris paribus clauses 
apply or a set of rules is available to govern their application.  The exhaustive listing presupposes 
knowing all the situations in which the ceteris paribus clauses are applicable, something the 
inclusion of the clause tacitly acknowledges is not the case. Rules for applying rules raise the 
specter of infinite regress. 
 Both of these authors seem to be drawing the conclusion that whatever an important 
subset of the instructions is, it does not consist of algorithms or rules.  There appears to be a 
richer variety of interpretations of rules that need to be considered than those in this analysis. 
Besides the possibility of more ways of construing individual rules there appear to be a number 
of other factors that need to be taken into account.  Among the variables that potentially might 
make a difference are: (i) the nature of the concept being dealt with; (ii) different possible natures 
of the individual rules; (iii)  how the rules fit together to specify the overall procedure or strategy; 
(iv) what is involved in determining that a rule is applicable; and (v) how it is determined when 
the process of applying the rules is at an end. 
 
 
7.0 A second look at the interpretation of instructions as rules 
 
7.1 Alternative Conceptions of a Rule 
 
 One possible line of attack is to consider alternative conceptions of individual rules. 
There are several relatively standard ways in which universal rules are altered when faced with 
exceptions or instances in which they are not applicable: (i) increase the set of rules and narrow 
the scope of the individual rules so that the rule in question no longer apples to the offending 
situation or (ii) make rules probabilistic. The first attempts to retain something close to the 
conception of rule discussed above, but with more rules each of which has a more restricted 
scope. An issue to be dealt with on this conception is how to distinguish the situations that 
warrant a change in the rule from ones that should result in abandonment rather than revision of 
the rule. The second allows for exceptions, but requires a metric which seems implausible in the 
situation being considered.   A more recent suggestion of a  possibility for rules that allow 
exceptions, but do not require a metric, is default rules.  
 
 
7.1.1 Defaults 
 
 Defaults are, in a sense, a more formal representation of rules of thumb.  Utilizing them  
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does result in defeasible reasoning.  Consider the common sense notion that birds can fly.  This is 
a useful generalization, but one that clearly has exceptions – dead birds do not fly, ostriches and 
penguins do not fly, some sick and injured birds do not fly.  While there are major categories of 
exceptions that can be listed, exhaustively listing all of the exceptions is impossible.  
Nonetheless, holding the generalization that birds fly, while noting known major categories of 
exception, seems worthwhile as it appears to lead to true conclusions more often than not. It is 
this notion that defaults are intended to capture (Besnard, pp. 1-4; 31-36; 101-110).  Consider the 
following: 
 
 
BIRD (x): FLY (x) and ~PENGUIN(x) and ~OSTRICH(x)
FLY (x) 
 
which represents a default. It is to be interpreted as “if x is a bird and if it is consistent that x can 
fly then infer that x can fly.” The whole claim is the default. BIRD(x) above the line is called the 
prerequisite of this default  -- the basic category of entity we are dealing with.  FLY(x) and 
~PENGUIN(x) and ~OSTRICH(x) above the line is the justification of the default while the  
FLY (x) below the line is the conclusion of the default.  As another example consider: 
 
SUNDAY(x): FISHINGDAY(x) and WAKINGDAY(x) 
FISHINGDAY(x) 
 
 Default reasoning depends on not having complete information .  Conclusions of defaults 
depend on the absence of information, e.g., if this is a bird it can fly unless there is some other 
information that is inconsistent with this particular bird being able to fly.   
 An interesting project would be to attempt to set up defaults for the various indicator 
words listed previously. This would result in defeasible reasoning, but with a number of items to 
check before the consequent of the default was accepted.  Clearly, a start would be achieved 
simply by taking the instructions from various texts and attempting to codify it in default form.   
However, all is not unproblematic with respect to defaults.  One of the problems with defaults is 
that it is fairly simple to generate inconsistencies.  For instance consider the following additional 
default: 
 
HOLIDAY(x): ~FISHINGDAY(x) and ~WAKINGDAY(x) 
~WAKINGDAY(x) 
 
If we have a day that is both a Sunday and a holiday, then we can infer that that day is 
both a fishing day by the earlier default and not a waking day by this default.  Additional rules 
need to be in place to provide guidance as to which of the two inconsistent claims is to be given 
preference.  A legitimate question to raise is whether or not this isn’t simply a formalization of 
the previously encountered problem with ceteris paribus clauses. 
 Moreover, while the goal is having a system of defeasible reasoning that doesn’t mean 
that each of the rules (or any of them for that matter) must themselves be defeasible.  How the 
whole set of rules operate together is another way to support defeasible reasoning. This provides 
us with other possibilities for consideration. 
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7.2 Automation and Algorithms 
 
One of the positions discussed earlier considered the possibility of interpreting the 
instructions as algorithms. However, that discussion relied on an intuitive conception of 
algorithm.  A more systematic consideration of algorithms will facilitate a deeper analysis. An 
algorithm is an infallible, step-by-step recipe, where all legitimate steps are designated in 
advance, for obtaining a pre-specified result in a finite number of steps.  Each of these 
characteristics is worth examining individually. 
Infallible means the procedure is guaranteed to succeed positively in a finite number of 
steps.  A positive technique is one that can succeed absolutely, totally, and without qualification. 
A positive technique isn’t guaranteed to succeed. The question isn’t whether it will succeed, but 
rather how well it can succeed. A reliable procedure has a high likelihood of success whereas a 
guaranteed procedure has a hundred percent likelihood of success. 
“Step-by-step” means: (i) the procedure prescribes one step at a time, one after another; 
(ii) it is clear when a step has been completed and what the result of that step is; (iii) after each 
step, the next step is both determined and obvious.  However, this doesn’t mean that there can’t 
be branches in the step by step routine. Which branch is to be taken in a particular case being 
completely determined by the previous steps. 
Finite means that the procedure terminates in a determinant number of steps although that 
number will not necessarily be known in advance.  An algorithm is a procedure that always 
terminates.  Algorithms can be either decision procedures or calculation procedures.  It is a 
decision procedure or method if the final answer it provides is either a “yes” or a “no”.  It is a 
calculation procedure if the final step is exhibiting some object. Algorithms can be elementary -- 
utilizing only one of the initially given basic defined steps -- or arbitrarily complicated operations 
accomplished by performing ordered combinations of elementary operations. 
Whenever the legal moves of a formal system are fully determined by algorithms, then 
that system can be automated.  However, the distinction needs to be made between whether a 
system can be automated and whether the system is such that every determination required by the 
system is algorithmic. 
In a chess program the move-lister component -- what moves can be made given the 
current configuration of the board -- is algorithmic and theoretically trivial, but the move-
chooser component  is a different story. Here all sorts of factors need to be considered and it is 
highly unlikely that there is only a single correct choice.  If the criteria to be utilized in selecting 
a move from among the possible moves are laid out in sufficient detail, the calculation 
procedure to determine what that move might be is algorithmic, but the process used to choose 
those criteria is not.  In the case of argument determination and reconstruction there is 
frequently more than one possible answer consistent with the evidence available to us. However, 
after selecting the criteria to be used to determine an answer, the process of determining the 
answer that fits those criteria may be algorithmic. 
It may appear that a branching algorithm includes choice.  What a branching algorithm 
includes are exhaustive and inclusive options.  Simply having followed the preceding steps of 
the algorithm will definitively determine which of the options applies. When choosing between 
alternative interpretations of a passage the choice is not definitively determined by previous 
steps in the process. 
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Given this analysis Blumberg’s earlier claim that there was no algorithm to determine 
argument structure appears to be correct, but his claim about being able to write a general 
argument recognition program involves considerations in addition to algorithms – namely what 
are ways we can choose among the choices? 
 
 
7.3 Heuristics 
 
 How can a system of allowing choices be automated?  The real problem is to design a 
chooser that makes good (reasonable, intelligent, wise….?) choices. Fallible, but fairly reliable 
procedures are called heuristics. Heuristics are not algorithms because algorithms must be 
infallible.  It may be possible to devise a strict, precise formula for applying and combining 
various well-defined rules of thumb.  The output of this formula is a fallible, but relatively 
reliable estimate of the best move in a given situation.  If the formula itself is perfectly explicit 
and unambiguous, then it can provide the basis for a routine that infallibly calculates the value. 
As a routine to calculate the estimate it is an algorithm. If the goal is finding the optimal move, 
then it is only a heuristic.  There are numerous heuristic procedures in widespread use; (i)  hill 
climbing technique – determine  a solution and then attempt to achieve a better solution; (ii) 
greedy random adaptive search procedure; (iii) genetic algorithms; (iv) simulated annealing 
algorithms; and (v) tabu search algorithms.  Beyond heuristics themselves meta-heuristics can 
guide and modify other heuristics to produce “better” solutions beyond those generated by a 
single heuristic. A system utilizing heuristics can be automated.  What the heuristic is and to 
what answers it applies needs to be specified. 
What are the implications of this for argument identification and reconstruction?  It 
suggests that the appropriate way to conceive of any effort to construct an automated program for 
argument recognition and reconstruction would involve both algorithms and heuristics. Which 
would be used where would depend on the question being asked and whether or not a unique 
answer can be calculated.  But clearly there would be at least two different sorts of rules involved 
– algorithms and heuristics. 
  
 
8.0 The Hierarchy of Instructions 
 
 8.1 Meta-data 
 
Whether a computer program or a human is attempting to analyze a passage to determine 
whether there are arguments in the passage and, if so, reconstruct those arguments, they are 
working with data – the passage – and attempting to characterize various components of that data 
– meta-data. Meta-data are simply data about data. There are numerous common instances of 
metadata. For example, a library card catalog is a collection of metadata elements.  Meta-data are 
themselves data and can be treated as such.  In data management the contrast is sometimes drawn 
between structured data and unstructured data.  The difference appears to be whether there is an 
explicit theory of meta-data available and the extent to which the various constituents of the data 
carry explicit meta-data labels.   
A passage is a dataset which for the purpose of either formal or informal logic we are, in 
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effect, attempting to make explicit the meta-data.  Any given statement can function in a variety 
of ways.  Which of the ways it is functioning in a particular case -- as a premise, a conclusion, an 
irrelevant claim, as both a premise and a conclusion -- is relevant meta-data from the standpoint 
of argument analysis.  If the meta-data are explicit or nearly so, then the meta-data are readily 
available to utilize as part of the processing. If the meta-data are not explicit, then one is facing a 
more difficult proposition.  How should one attempt to make the meta-data explicit?  
One way of conceiving the giving of instructions is giving procedures for determining 
what the meta-data is and how to use them in the construction of arguments or symbolizations. 
To do this answers need to be provided to:  (i) what counts as the pertinent meta-data?  (ii) are 
the meta-data explicitly available and, if not, how are they determined?  (iii) how is the meta-data 
utilized to determine the symbolization or reconstruct the argument?  There are really two main 
stages here. First, determining and making explicit the relevant meta-data.  Meta-data will 
include that the element is a statement, what type of statement an element is, the arguments in 
which an element occurs, and the role in each of the arguments in which the statement occurs.  
This later is dependent on the theory of argument espoused. Secondly, processing the meta-data 
to create the larger argumentative structure composed of the initial units.  Again this will depend 
of the theory of argument held.   
One way of presenting the metadata information is via a mark up language. HTML  -- 
HyperText Markup Language, used to develop web pages, is an example of a markup language.  
The markup is expressed by tags.  Usually, but not always,  there are start tags and end tags 
appearing in pairs, e.g., <P> and </P>.  Attributes extend the capabilities of tags by allowing the 
tag to have a variety of values. XML – extensible markup language – allows one to determine 
one’s own set of tags within the demands of the syntax of XML.  How one is utilizing one’s set 
of tags is described by a DTD – document type definition—that consists of element declarations 
and attribute declarations. Element declarations allow you to name your elements (tags) and 
define any children that an element might have.  One starts with a root element and then all other 
elements are nested within the root or a child of the root element.  Elements can be defined to 
have different types of content.  HTML is actually a formally defined DTD of SGML – 
Standardized General Markup Language. In our case what we would want to do is develop a 
markup language for picking out what is important about a passage as argumentative discourse. 
Given the meta-data can the argument structure be calculated? Several programs do a 
version of this -- Araucaria, Reason!Able, and Athena.  To accomplish this Araucaria develops a 
markup language AML – Argument Markup Language --  that has the most basic element ARG 
which has possible children of SCHEMESET, TEXT, and AU where AU represents an argument 
element, TEXT represents the original text , and SCHEMESET stands for an argument scheme.  
In turn AU has children indicating whether it is a proposition or a refutation and a member of a 
linked or convergent argument.  A SCHEME consists of a name, form and a set of critical 
questions. These reflect the various arguments schemes proposed by Doug Walton. 
Can the meta-data themselves be calculated or at least an approximation to the meta-data 
be calculated. Clearly this is an immense and difficult undertaking.  I am not sure that anyone has 
actually attempted to do this.  Nonetheless, this is what we attempt to accomplish with students 
in informal logic courses.  Texts offer rules of thumb and comment on the exceptions. Can we do 
more to analyze the instructions we give and make them more explicit? 
There is also an additional consideration with regard to meta-data and their manipulation. 
The algorithms that can be performed depend on the data structure and part of the value of the 
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data structure depends on what algorithms are available to make calculations based on that data 
structure. There are various ways of conceiving this combination – data structure/inference 
procedure.  In logic programming the data structures mirror the predicate calculus and the 
algorithm is a type of deductive proof.  In rule-based systems knowledge is represented in 
conditional production rules.  Algorithms match the rules against a knowledge base and draw 
conclusions. Frames or Schemas present another approach to this combination. Which form of 
representation works best for argument identification, analysis , and reconstruction? The above 
intended as an illustration, not a claim that this is the only or the best way to accomplish 
designating and manipulating meta-data. 
 
 
9.0 Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper does not do justice to the variety of alternative ways in which the instructions 
might be interpreted as rules. A thoroughgoing analysis would catalog all the different possible 
interpretations of rules and analyze how they fared against the phenomena they were employed to 
organize as well as review their theoretical limitations. Nor has it considered other possible 
interpretations in addition to a rule interpretation. Rule-based reasoning is not the only possibility 
for attempting to understand how the meta-reasoning in logic proceeds.  One of the standard 
ways of providing instructions is via examples and they have not been analyzed in this paper. 
Case-based reasoning is another possibility that needs to be examined. (Asquith 2002). 
 However, I believe that it has shown that more needs to be said about the utilization of 
rules than the analysis provided by either Blumberg or Govier.  There is a sense in which 
Blumberg’s and Govier’s conclusions might be taken to be correct, e.g., if one were restricted to 
only algorithmic processes utilizing universal generalizations with simple antecedents and 
expecting that there is a single correct answer that the algorithm will generate. However, this 
analysis of the role of rules and the dismissal of the possibility of automated or formal systems by 
Blumberg and Govier was based on a limited analysis of the possible conceptions of rules. While 
the complexity is enormous, there appear to be research programmes to be followed in an attempt 
to see what is possible.   
 There are various ways in which the understanding of the instructions we provide can be 
important. Understanding them is necessary to develop automated aids to utilize in instruction.  
Repetition and immediate feedback are proven pedagogical techniques.  Automated aids could 
take a variety of formats – human provides the meta-data and machine constructs the argument 
based on the meta-data provided; machine calculates the meta-data, constructs argument based 
on the meta-data, and student critiques; student presents several possibilities and machine 
assesses the relative merits of these alternatives; human presents a possibility and then the 
machine presents alternatives for the human to make merit judgments about.  Irrespective of the 
success or failure of attempts at automation there appear to be a number of reasons why an in 
depth effort to analyze the nature of the instructions provided to students might be productive. 
Understanding the nature of the instructions being given is necessary in order to improve 
instruction in a deliberate way and in a way that can be assessed. 
 An interesting characteristic of introductory courses in either formal or informal logic is 
their reflexive nature.  While the subject matter is not reasoning itself, but rather some type of 
normative theory about the results of reasoning, we are nevertheless presupposing that the 
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students do possess both the ability to reason and to evaluate their own reasoning.  In many 
respects it appears that we may be expecting the students to exhibit more sophisticated reasoning 
than the patterns of reasoning that they are studying.  The exception may be if what is necessary 
to succeed is simply to learn to follow an algorithmic procedure.  How similar is the reasoning 
we are presupposing for introductory logic and informal logic?  How is the reasoning being 
presupposed related to the reasoning that is being studied?  In the case of formal logic the 
reasoning being required of the students may be less sophisticated than the reasoning being 
required in the case of informal logic. 
What are the relative advantages and disadvantages of rule based reasoning versus case 
based reasoning? Answering that questions requires developed views of both case-based and 
rule-based reasoning. 
Can any of the heuristic strategies that might be used by a computer program be of use to 
students?  I, at least, do sometimes encourage student to utilize reasoning similar to some of the 
heuristic strategies.  In particular, hill climbing by telling them to at least find some interpretation 
and then concentrate on seeing if we can find an improved alternative interpretation.   
This very preliminary look at the instructions of informal logic raises more questions than 
it answers, but hopefully prompts further discussion and analysis of those instructions.   
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